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A central goal in information theory and cryptography is finding simple characterizations of optimal
communication rates under various restrictions and security requirements. Ideally, the optimal key rate for
a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol would be given by a single-letter formula involving
optimization over a single use of an effective channel. We explore the possibility of such a formula for
the simplest and most widely used QKD protocol, Bennnett-Brassard-84 with one-way classical post-
processing. We show that a conjectured single-letter formula is false, uncovering a deep ignorance about
good private codes and exposing unfortunate complications in the theory of QKD. These complications
are not without benefit—with added complexity comes better key rates than previously thought possible.
The threshold for secure key generation improves from a bit error rate of 0.124 to 0.129.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.100.170502 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
using public channels to remotely establish a secret key
whose security is not predicated on the difficulty of some
computational task. Rather, the security of the key gener-
ated by a QKD protocol depends only on fundamental laws
of physics. As a result there has been an enormous amount
of work on practical and theoretical aspects of QKD, and a
corresponding rapid progress in both [1].
The first QKD protocol, Bennnett-Brassard-84 (BB84),
was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [2], and like
all QKD schemes, it is based on the tradeoff between
information gain and disturbance in quantum mechanics.
To establish a bit of raw key, the sender (Alice) encodes a
random bit into one of two conjugate bases (X or Z),
chosen at random, and transmits it to a receiver (Bob).
Bob measures in either the X or Z basis, also chosen at
random. After generating a large number of bits (say, 2n),
Alice and Bob can sift out the bits for which they both
chose the same basis by public discussion, leaving roughly
n bits.
Alice then randomly permutes her remaining bits and
announces the permutation to Bob, after which they per-
form parameter estimation by comparing a small fraction
of their bits to find the error rate of the sifted key. If the
fraction p of bits on which they disagree is sufficiently
small, they proceed with information reconciliation and
privacy amplification to finally arrive at a secret key. The
essence of the protocol is that if an eavesdropper Eve, who
is assumed to have control of the quantum channel, exam-
ines the signals in order to determine the key, she will
necessarily cause some disturbance which manifests itself
as errors in the sifted key. Thus p also characterizes how
much Eve could have learned about the key.
An important property of any QKD protocol is the
amount of noise that can be tolerated without compromis-
ing the privacy of the resulting key, the amount of noise at
which the protocol aborts. The entanglement-based secur-
ity proof of Shor and Preskill [3] showed that BB84 can be
used to generate a private key for detected bit error rates as
high as p  0:11, basically by showing there exist
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) [4,5] codes correcting
noise up to this level. Remarkably, it was recently found
[6,7] that this can be improved to p  0:124 if Alice adds
independent noise to her sifted key before performing the
distillation steps, which has been conjectured to be optimal
among all one-way key distillation protocols [7]. The key
rates of [6] come from evaluating a single-letter key rate
for an effective state found by Devetak and Winter in [8],
and indeed the 0.124 threshold of [6,7] is the optimal
threshold for this single-letter formula [9]. If these rates
were optimal among all protocols, it would indicate a
single-letter formula for one-way QKD key-rates, provid-
ing a dramatic simplification in the theory of quantum key
distribution protocols.
We will show that p  0:124 is not optimal, and the
threshold is at least p  0:129. We increase the threshold
by finding improved error correcting codes for the infor-
mation reconciliation phase. The technique is analogous to
those of [10–12], which use degenerate CSS codes to
achieve higher quantum capacities than are achievable by
the single-letter formula for quantum capacity arising from
random stabilizer codes. Though the true maximization
needed for the multiletter capacity formula in [8] remains
out of reach, we are able to evaluate rates for particular
multiletter inputs which achieve higher key rates than the
single-letter maximum. While this is suggestive, we em-
phasize that our results to not necessarily rule out a single-
letter formula for the one-way key rate. We have shown
that the single-letter Devetak-Winter formula does not give
the one-way distillable key, but this does not preclude the
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existence of some other single-letter optimization problem
that gives the optimal key rate.
Taken together, our information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification steps can be described by a highly
degenerate CSS code. A quantum code is called degenerate
if its syndrome does not uniquely identify the errors which
it corrects. This is a uniquely quantum effect—there is no
such thing as a degenerate classical code—and all such
codes involve entanglement. It appears remarkable then
that degeneracy should help in the classical processing task
of key distillation. Moreover, Alice and Bob need not
perform any multiparticle quantum operations even in
our improved protocol. The resolution is that Eve’s best
attacks involve entanglement, and degeneracy will make
this work against her.
Degenerate codes have been used for QKD before,
specifically, to improve the threshold of the six-state pro-
tocol from 0.126 to 0.127 [13]. However, this protocol did
not involve noisy processing, and in fact a better threshold
was obtained for the six-state protocol by [6,7]. Our result
combines degenerate codes with noisy processing, leading
to an advantage over either one alone.
Analytic key-rate expression.—To determine the secret
key rate of the modified protocol, we follow [6,7,14]. First,
the prepare and measure protocol can be converted to an
equivalent scheme in which Alice prepares the maximally
entangled state jimnAB and sends half to Bob. Each party
then randomly and independently measures either X or Z
on each signal, saving the outcomes for use in parameter
estimation and key generation. They discard the outcomes
where their basis choice did not agree, and denoting the
remaining outcomes KA and KB it follows from Corollary
6.5.2 of [14] that for any m-bit processing step KmA ! U
and U ! V it is possible to use standard (i.e., unstructured,
random) error correction and privacy amplification to dis-
till a secret key at rate
 r  1
m
inf
AB2p
SUjVEm  SUjVKmB 	; (1)
evaluated on the state generated by performing the pro-
cessing on mAB , and where p is the set of single pair Bell-
diagonal states AB passing the parameter estimation phase
of the protocol and Em is the purification of mAB , which we
must assume belongs to Eve. S  Tr log is the
von Neumann entropy. This expression is similar to what
was found in [6,7], with the additional feature that it
includes blockwise processing. Since the X and Z bases
are randomly used to create the sifted key, the error esti-
mation provides an estimate of the bit- and phase-flip noise
rates, so that the allowable AB are of the form AB 
1  t  2pjihj  p  tjihj  ji 

hj  tjihj for t 2 0; p	.
Below, we choose a particular KmA ! U ! V for which
Eq. (1) outperforms all previously known protocols for
large p. The measurements leading to KA and KB will be
the same as for the usual BB84 protocol, with the process-
ing step chosen as follows. For each m-bit block of KA
(x1; x2; . . . ; xm) Alice independently flips each bit with
probability q, resulting in ~x  ~x1; . . . ; ~xm. She then com-
putes U  ~x1; ~x1  ~x2; . . . ; ~x1  ~xm and sends V  ~x1 
~x2; . . . ; ~x1  ~xm to Bob, after which they do error correc-
tion and privacy amplification as usual. The key rate they
achieve is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.—The key rate achieved using the processing
x ! U ! V with U  ~x1; ~x1  ~x2; . . . ; ~x1  ~xm, V 
~x1  ~x2; . . . ; ~x1  ~xm, where ~x  x  f and f is a string
of independent 0-1 random variables, each with probability
q of being 1, is given by
 
r  1
m

1X
s
P~pmsHP~pmujs mSp;q
 S

1
2
mp;q  12Z
mmp;qZm

: (2)
Here p;q  1 qj’ih’j  qj’ih’j with j’i 
1 pp j0i  pp j1i, ~p  p1 q  q1 p, while
P~pmu; s is defined in Lemma 2. The entropy H of a
classical probability distribution P is given by HP 
PlPl logPl.
We proceed by noting that in the entanglement picture,
our processing step is equivalent to Alice first adding
independent bit errors to her halves of the noisy EPR pairs,
measuring the stabilizers of an m-qubit repetition code, and
then sending her syndrome outcomes to Bob. We apply the
following lemma, which follows from [12].
Lemma 2.—The m-qubit repetition code with stabilizers
Z1Z2; . . . ; Z1Zm maps the error XuZv to the logical error
Xu1Zml1vl and syndrome s  u1  u2; . . . ; u1  um.
When used to correct independent bit errors of probability
p, the probability of a logical bit error u and syndrome s is
given by
 Ppmu; s  pms1 ps	ups1 pms	1u (3)
for s  jsj.
Proof of Theorem 1.—To evaluate Eq. (1), first let
 mAB 
X
u;v
puvX
u
BZ
v
Bjihj	mAB ZvBXuB; (4)
with puv such that pu 
P
vpuv  pjuj1 pmjuj, for
measured bit error rate p, and similarly for pv.
Alice adds independent noise at error rate q to the A
register, so the state of the Alice-Bob-Eve system can be
described as
 
X
u;v;f

puvqf
p jfiA0XuBZvBXfBjimAB juiE1 jviE2 ; (5)
where we have used the fact that XA  IjiAB 
I  XBjiAB. Note that Eve’s system is determined by
the fact that in the worst case she holds the purification of
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the state after it emerges from the channel. However, she
does not hold the purification of the noise Alice adds.
Alice and Bob then measure the stabilizers of the
m-qubit repetition code (Z1Z2; . . . ; Z1Zm) and Alice sends
her outcomes to Bob. This is equivalent to having Bob
defer his measurement until he receives Alice’s message
and then coherently correcting his key bit, which we will
consider here. Renaming Bob’s m 1 syndrome qubits
system B0, the state they will share in this case is
 
X
u;v;f

puvqf
p jfiA0Xu1f1B Z
m
l1vl
B jiAB
 jsu;fiB0 juiE1ZfE2 jviE2 ; (6)
where su;f is an (m 1)-bit string labeling the basis states
of B0 whose jth bit is su;fj  u1  uj1  f1  fj1.
Note that the Zf acting on Eve’s second system comes
from the commutation of ZvB and XfB.
Getting rid of the A0 system (but keeping it from Eve),
we now let Alice and Bob measure systems A and BB0 in
the computational basis, respectively. According to Eq. (1),
the difference of conditional entropies for the resulting
state will give us the key rate. This will be simpler to
analyze by first rewriting the lower bound as
 r  1
m
inf
AB2p
IA;BB0  IA;E: (7)
IA;BB0 is the mutual information [IX;Y 
SX  SY  SXY] of ABB0  12
P1
x0 jxihxjA  xB0B,
where
 
xB0B 
X
f
X
u
qfpujx f1  u1ihx f1  u1jB  jsu;fi

 hsu;fj
 X
s
P~pms
X1
u0
P~pmujsjx uihx ujB  jsihsjB0 ;
and the P~pmu; s are given by Lemma 2. Thus, the mutual
information IA;BB0 is exactly 1PsP~pmsHP~pmujs.
Notice that this term only depends on pu, which is deter-
mined by the parameter estimation phase, so it will be the
same for all AB 2 p.
Turning to the second term in Eq. (7), we want to find the
mutual information of the Alice-Eve system, AE1E2  12 
P1
x0 jxihxjA  xE1E2 , where
 xE1E2  ZmE2 x
 X
u;v1;v2;f
qf

pujv1pujv2
p juihujE1
 pv1pv2p Zfjv1ihv2jE2ZfZmE2 x: (8)
Note that the ZmE2 x comes from the action of Z
m
l1vl on B.
When bit and phase errors are independent, this expression
can be further simplified. Defining   Pupujuihuj and
p;q  1 qj’ih’j  qj’ih’j with j’i 

1 pp j0i  pp j1i, we can write
 xE1;E2  E1  ZmE2 xmp;q	E2ZmE2 x: (9)
Actually, we have to maximize IA;E1E2 overall puv
corresponding to states in AB 2 p, but the largest value
is attained for independent phase and bit errors. This means
that Eve’s optimal attack on the protocol will be to choose
AB 2 p with t  p2. In particular, if Eve starts with the
independent u, v state, by tracing out the E1 system and
using the isometry
 U  X
v;u

pujv
p juiE3 jviE2hvjE2 ; (10)
then completely dephasing E3, she can construct a AE2E3
with the same mutual information as if the errors were
distributed according to pujvpv. Since mutual information
cannot be increased by local operations, the independent
noise state must have the largest value. Moreover, as the E1
system is uncorrelated with AE2, IA;E can be easily
computed, yielding
 IA;E  S

1
2
mp;q  12Z
mmp;qZm

mSp;q:
Taking the difference between IA;BB0 and IA;E, keep-
ing in mind we must send m qubits for each m block, leads
to the overall key rate of Eq. (2).
Numerical key rates.—We now evaluate Eq. (2) for
particular p, q, and m. Sp;q is easily calculated, and
the second term can be evaluated efficiently via Eq. (3).
The most difficult term is S12mp;q  12Zmmp;qZm, but it
can be handled as follows. Because of the permutation
invariance of the state mp;q , it is compactly expressed as
a direct sum over the SU2 irreducible representations
(irreps). Each irrep occurs with some degeneracy, giving
a permutation factor, which by Schur’s lemma [15] is
maximally mixed. Using the expression for multiple copies
of a qubit mixed state from [16], which gives the irreduc-
ible states of mp;q as a function of its Bloch vector and
doing the same for Zmmp;qZm, we can compute
S12mp;q  12Zmmp;qZm for m up to several hundred.
In general, larger m gives higher thresholds with the
optimal q  0:3 increasing slowly with m (Fig. 1). m 
400 and q  0:32 give nonzero key rate up to p  0:1292,
but for larger m the computation becomes quite slow.
Discussion.—Given the pattern of improving thresholds
with larger m, it is tempting to guess the best threshold
within our family of codes will be when m ! 1 as q !
0:5. While we have not been able to do so, we hope that an
asymptotic analysis of our key rates in the limit of large m
could be tractable. Along these lines, note that an exact
analysis of large repetition codes in the context of quantum
capacities was successfully carried out in [10].
We note that our codes are highly restricted, and it is not
at all clear that they should be optimal. One idea for better
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rates is to adapt the concatenation of repetition codes in
conjugate bases used in [11,12] to key generation, using a
repetition code in the X basis to improve privacy amplifi-
cation. A more ambitious approach is to develop new
degenerate codes for this problem, perhaps using the heu-
ristic suggested in [12].
The best upper bound on the BB84 key rate is H1=2
2p1 p H2p1 p [17]. This gives an upper
bound on the threshold for BB84 of p  1 1= 2p =2 
0:1464, matching the bound due to the optimal individual
attack found in [18]. There remains a significant gap
between our lower bound of 0.129 and this upper bound.
Our one-way protocols bear a striking resemblance to
two-way protocols using advantage distillation [19]. In
particular, an advantage distillation protocol can be de-
scribed as using a repetition code, with Bob sending the
syndromes back to Alice. Error correction and privacy
amplification are performed on blocks for which no error
is detected, while the blocks for which an error is detected
are thrown away. Without back communication from Bob,
Alice would not know the syndromes, and thus be unable to
discard blocks in which Bob had detected an error. Our
findings show that even in this case, with Alice ignorant of
the syndromes, and thus unable to discard bad blocks, there
is still a benefit in using a repetition code. The repetition
code works ‘‘better than expected,’’ because it collapses
many phase errors to a single logical phase error, while still
providing information about bit errors. This benefit should
also appear when the code is used for advantage distillation
with noisy processing.
One-way protocols with noisy processing can be viewed
quite naturally as distillation protocols for twisted EPR
pairs [20,21]. In [20] it was shown that noisy processing
can be interpreted as the deflection of Eve’s correlations
away from the sifted key into a ‘‘shield’’ system, which
purifies the noise added by Alice. Viewed in this way, the
benefit of a repetition code is that it allows us to combine
the ‘‘soft’’ approach of deflecting phase errors and the
‘‘hard’’ approach of correcting bit errors—while learning
about bit errors that we must correct, we are simulta-
neously decreasing Eve’s correlation with the key, reduc-
ing the need for privacy amplification later.
We thank Debbie Leung, John Preskill, and Renato
Renner for several valuable discussions. This work grew
out of discussions between G. S. and J. M. R. at the
University of Queensland, whose hospitality we appreci-
ate. J. M. R. acknowledges the Alexander von Humboldt
Foundation, G. S. NSF Grant No. PHY-0456720 and
Canada’s NSERC, and J. A. S. ARO Contract
No. DAAD19-01-C-0056.
[1] N. Gisin et al., Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing (IEEE, Bangalore, India, 1984), p. 175.
[3] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[4] A. Steane, Proc. R. Soc. A 452, 2551 (1996).
[5] A. R. Calderbank and P. W. Shor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098
(1996).
[6] B. Kraus et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005).
[7] R. Renner et al., Phys. Rev. A 72, 012332 (2005).
[8] I. Devetak and A. Winter, Proc. R. Soc. A 461, 207 (2005).
[9] The optimality of the 0.124 threshold for the single-letter
Devetak-Winter formula has not been proven in the lit-
erature, but is easily verified by numerical optimization.
[10] P. W. Shor and J. A. Smolin, arXiv:quant-ph/9604006.
[11] D. P. DiVincenzo et al., Phys. Rev. A 57, 830 (1998).
[12] G. Smith and J. A. Smolin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 030501
(2007).
[13] H.-K. Lo, Quantum Inf. Comput. 1, 81 (2001).
[14] R. Renner, Ph.D. thesis, ETH, 2005.
[15] B. Simon, Representations of Finite and Compact Groups
(AMS, USA, 1996).
[16] E. Bagan et al., Phys. Rev. A 73, 032301 (2006).
[17] G. Smith and J. A. Smolin, arXiv:0712.2471.
[18] C. A. Fuchs et al., Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 (1997).
[19] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 49,
457 (2003).
[20] J. M. Renes and G. Smith, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 020502
(2007).
[21] K. Horodecki et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 160502 (2005).
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.116
0.118
0.12
0.122
0.124
0.126
0.128
q
p
FIG. 1. Bit error rate p at which the key rate goes to zero as a
function of processing noise q when using various-sized repeti-
tion codes in the BB84 protocol. The curves are, from bottom to
top, m  1, m  10; 20; . . . ; 100, illustrating the fact that a
longer repetition code allows a higher threshold. As m is
increased, the optimal q also grows. Taking m  400 and q 
0:32 gives our best threshold of 0.1292.
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